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Abstract 
This paper makes three main arguments. First, a critique of both the 
traditional state-centric approach to security and the more recently 
articulated human-centric approach suggests that each is necessary but not 
sufficient to address the contemporary security agenda. Second, there is 
however conceptual and empirical evidence that shows there is an 
evolving dialectic between these two approaches which is producing new 
thinking about security. The dialectic is between two referent objects, the 
state and people, between internal and external threats to these referent 
objects and between the various military and non-military means for 
enhancing the security of each. The dialectic also involves causal and 
constitutive connections between these elements. The final argument is 
that this evolving dialectic suffers from a number of problems, not least of 
which is the difficulty of achieving a balance between the two approaches 
on any given security issue. Nonetheless, in principle a dialectic between 
the state-centric and human-centric approaches offers a promising way of 
addressing the contemporary security agenda of state, trans-state and 
intra-state security issues and the connections between them. 
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The evolving dialectic between state-centric 
and human-centric security  
PAULINE KERR1 
Scholars and practitioners for over a decade have increasingly used the 
term ‘human security’ to convey a new human-centric rather than the 
traditional state-centric understanding of security. Notwithstanding its 
growing applicationparticularly in UN policy statements, states’ foreign 
policies, scholarly journals and teaching curriculumthe idea of human 
security continues to be highly contentious.2 Equally contentious however 
is the value of the traditional state-centric conceptualisation of security to 
address the contemporary security agenda. From the disciplinary 
perspective of international relations (IR) and security studies (SS) the 
discussions about these different approaches to security have produced 
many justifications for their respective position.3 But what is not 
examined in any depth is whether or not all this activity is having any 
impact on how ‘security’ more generally is conceptualised. Another way 
of asking the question is whether or not there is any interaction between 
 
1  Research Fellow, Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian 
Studies, The Australian National University. Thanks to Bill Tow, Chris Reus-Smit, Wynne Russell, 
Mary-Louise Hickey and Lynne Payne for their various contributions to this paper. 
2  Roland Paris, ‘Human security: Paradigm shift or hot air?’, International Security 26(2) Fall 2001, 
pp. 87–102. 
3  See for example, Barry Buzan, ‘Human security: What it means and what it entails’, paper presented 
at the 14th Asia–Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur, 3–7 June 2000, pp. 1–15; Yuen Foong Khong, 
‘Human security: A shotgun approach to alleviating human misery?’, Global Governance 7(3) 2001, 
pp. 231–6; William T. Tow, Ramesh Thakur and In-Taek Hyun (eds), Asia’s emerging regional 
order: Reconciling traditional and human security (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000); 
Andrew Mack, ‘Human security in the new millennium’, Work In Progress 16(3) 2002, pp. 4–6; 
Majid Tehranian (ed.), Worlds apart: Human security and global governance (London and New 
York: I.B. Tauris, in association with the Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research, 1999); 
Theodore Moran, ‘International economics and national security’, Foreign Affairs 69(5) 1990/91, 
pp. 74–90; Brad Roberts, ‘Human rights and international security’, Washington Quarterly 13(2) 
1990, pp. 65–75. Also see websites such as the Commission for Human Security 
<www.humansecuritynetwork.org>; the Canadian Consortium for Human Security 
<www.humansecuritybulletin.info>; and the Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and 
Conflict Research <www.hsph.harvard.edu/hpcr/cpi/cpi.htm>. 
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the two paradigms that is producing new thinking, perhaps a new thesis, 
about security.  
It is argued here that there is a security dialectic4 evolving between 
elements of the state-centric and human-centric approaches. The dialectic 
is between two referent objects, the state and people, between internal and 
external threats to these referent objects and between the various means 
for enhancing the security of each. The dialectic also involves causal and 
constitutive connections between these elements. Over time it is possible 
that a new synthesis in the form of a middle path or ‘via media’5 may 
develop between the state-centric and human-centric approaches. The 
conceptual evidence for this argument can be found in several recent 
scholarly works. There is also empirical evidence that some agents of 
securityvarious global institutions, states and non-state actors 
consider security in similar dialectical terms. The second point made in 
the paper is that there are problems with this approach. These are 
discussed in some detail. Nonetheless, in principle, a security dialectic 
between the paradigms and a possible new synthesis or via media does 
offer a way of addressing the growing number of issues that comprise the 
contemporary security agenda. The challenge is to establish the balance 
between the parts, to find both conceptually and in practice, the best via 
media in any given security situation.  
Establishing that there is a security dialectic is significant for several 
reasons. From a disciplinary perspective it shows that many scholars and 
even more actors develop security concepts and practices that take account 
of the different dimensions of security: that is, both state and human 
security, the external and internal security dimensions of security, issues of 
order and justice, and questions of ‘what is’ and ‘what ought-to-be’. This 
 
4  ‘Dialectic’ in this context refers to the ‘mildest use [that] seems only to imply that in any complex 
system of things, people, or thoughts, opposing forces or tendencies are at work, so that processes 
are likely to oscillate first one way and then another between extremes.’ However, it does not rule 
out the possibility that, in a Marxist sense, ‘dialectic means evolution by means of contradictions’ 
and that a new thesis evolves. Oxford English Dictionary Online (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), <dictionary.oed.com>. 
5  The idea of a ‘via media’ or ‘broad middle road’ between different traditions of thought is a well-
recognised argument made by the English School scholar, Martin Wight. See Martin Wight, pp. 17–
18 below, for further elaboration on the idea. 
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contrasts with the view that concepts and practices of security can be 
understood from one particular perspective, or one theory such as realism.6 
The main significance however is that formulating concepts and practice on 
the basis of a dialectic between different elements of security is, under the 
present circumstances, the most likely way of enhancing the security of 
people. We live in a world where dangerous inter-state, intra-state and 
transnational security issues relentlessly continue. The end of the Cold War 
did not bring peace. It is a world where the state, despite challenges, 
remains the dominant actor, where state-centric security remains dominant 
and indeed relevant, where sovereignty is both a minus and a plus. It is also 
a world where there are growing normative and utilitarian imperatives to 
provide better security for people. Understanding the growing inter-
connectedness between these issues, between the security of states and 
people, in terms of a security dialectic holds more promise than any single 
paradigmatic approach, despite the difficulties.  
The analysis here is in three parts. It starts by reviewing the state-centric 
and human-centric approaches to the idea of security in the IR/SS literature 
and the criticisms that each makes of the other. The conclusion drawn from 
this analysis is that each critique reveals serious shortcomings with the two 
positions and that an ideal-type approach to security would involve 
important elements of both. The second part examines recent work by 
several scholars that demonstrates an evolving approach to security that 
seeks to establish the connections and dialectics between the state-centric 
and human-centric approaches. The paper then examines the evidence for 
arguing that some important agents of securitysome global institutions, 
states and non-state actorsare establishing a similar approach. To some 
extent these conceptual and empirical developments satisfy the ideal-type 
suggested by the earlier critique. The third section analyses the strengths 
and weaknesses of the security dialectic approach arguing that in its present 
form insufficient attention is given to a proper balance between the state and 
 
6  The development of a security dialectic would seem to support the argument made by Peter J. 
Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara that ‘analytical eclecticism, not parsimony’ provides a better 
understanding of Japanese and Asian-Pacific security affairs. See Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo 
Okawara, ‘Japan, Asia–Pacific security, and the case for analytical eclecticism’, International 
Security 26(3) 2001/02, pp. 153–85.  
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human-centric approaches. The issue of balance is also a problem in 
practice with many security agents adopting a security dialectic that is still 
tipped towards the state-centric approach. The paper concludes that, not-
withstanding these conceptual and empirical shortcomings, security 
dialectics and possible via medias offer promising ways for advancing the 
concept and practice of security. Further research should explore this 
concluding proposition.   
STATE-CENTRIC AND HUMAN-CENTRIC APPROACHES TO SECURITY: 
BOTH NECESSARY, BUT NOT SUFFICIENT  
Within the discipline of international relations and its sub-discipline 
security studies, discussions about ‘security’ are often conducted within a 
conceptual framework that refers to the ‘referent object’ of security, 
‘threats’ to that referent object/s, and the ‘means’ by which the referent 
object attempts to prevent and protect itself from threats. For tradi-
tionalists the referent object is the state, the main threat is other states that 
have the capability and intention to use force to achieve their goals. The 
means for countering such threats is military deterrence, and if necessary 
the use of force if attack seems imminent or actually takes place. 
According to traditionalist scholars, the meaning of security has changed 
little over time and they remain unimpressed by yet another argument, this 
time about human security, for changing their view.7  
The state-centric critique of the human-centric perspective has several 
dimensions. According to many traditional scholars there are inadequate 
grounds for making human security the referent object of security. Barry 
Buzan, for example, is unconvinced that the focus on state security as the 
referent object should be replaced or even supplemented by human 
security.8 Buzan argues that the referent object of human security cannot 
readily be either the individual or all people everywhere—humankind. 
 
7  There is a vast literature that supports the traditional view of security. See for example, reviews by 
Sean M. Lynn-Jones, ‘International security studies’, International Studies Notes 16(3) 1992, pp. 
53–64; Stephen M. Walt, ‘The renaissance of security studies’, International Studies Quarterly 35(2) 
1991, pp. 211–39; and Patrick Morgan, ‘Safeguarding security studies’, Arms Control 13(3) 1992, 
pp. 464–79. 
8  Buzan, ‘Human security: What it means’. Buzan claims he is one of the few scholars to address 
human security from the perspective of international security.  
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Focus on the individual brings up the problem of agency since, in practice, 
individual security is an attempt to bypass the state and the state is a 
necessary, though not sufficient, condition for each person’s security. 
Moreover, Buzan argues that if human security is really about individual 
security then this is nothing new and it is already the focus of human rights 
law. If humankind is the referent of human security then it is ‘too big and 
too vague to have popular appeal’.9 If human security is about the middle 
level—or societal security—then it concerns collectivities of people that are 
collected together because they share a common identity of some form. 
Usually such collectivities are manifested as nations and religions which, 
Buzan argues, ‘is a short route back to the “national security” perspective 
from which human security advocates are presumably trying to escape’.10 
For these reasons Buzan rejects the idea of human security as a useful 
component of international security.   
Buzan’s argument reveals a particular line of thinking about what can 
legitimately constitute a security referent object, given ‘what is’ the nature 
of states and international relations and therefore the focus of the discipline. 
From this view both the context and the nature of relations between states is 
different to that which occurs inside the state. The international context is 
not founded on notions of social justice that usually operate at the domestic 
level but rather on anarchy and power politics and therefore on protecting 
national interests. Neither the international system nor the society of states 
assumes that order can be implemented, that justice or moral/ethical codes 
or any ‘ought-to-be’ norm will have a profound influence, as is most often 
the case within states. Apart from operating in a different context, inter-
national security has a different objective, the external security of states, and 
a different threat, the military power of states and finally a different means, 
the threat and or use of force. The nature of the state, the use of force and 
power inside the state is not the subject of relations between states or within 
the scope of the discipline. Hence for traditionalists, such as Buzan, trying 
to make people within states the object of security is conceptually and 
empirically flawed. 
 
  9  Buzan, ‘Human security: What it means’, p. 8. 
10  Buzan, ‘Human security: What it means’, p. 10. 
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Whereas Buzan mounts an argument against the conceptual and empiri-
cal validity of including human security within the practice and discipline of 
international relations, another well known IR/SS scholar, Yuen Foong 
Khong, criticises the idea of securitising the individual human being 
because it fails to provide practical guidance, either for setting priorities or 
for alleviating human insecurity.11 His view is that ‘in making all indivi-
duals a priority none actually benefits’.12 Criteria to distinguish between 
different types of security fears that individuals experience are needed for 
prioritising action. Furthermore, it is not clear, Khong argues, that 
securitising the individual will actually alleviate ‘the plight of the 
repressed’.13 He is sceptical that outside special areas, for example NATO’s 
sphere of interest, securitisation will lead to any significant improvement 
and hence the idea generates false hopes for the victims and the 
international community. Khong is also sceptical that ‘taking human 
security seriously’ will have a positive impact on international peace and 
security.14 ‘Putting people first’ he says suffers from the same lack of 
criteria for distinguishing between different types of people and is therefore 
‘too universalistic’ to provide policy guidance for improving international 
security. Khong’s state-centric bias is further revealed by his advice that it is 
better for people if they ‘cast their lot with their government—and their 
state—if they want a way out of their privation’.15  
Other sceptics, who are not necessarily advocates of state-centric security 
approaches, also have doubts about the analytical value of the idea. Roland 
Paris argues that human security is more useful as a rallying cry for non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), international agencies and some 
interested states and as a campaign slogan for political coalitions to fight for 
various causes, for example, the land mines convention and the establish-
ment of the International Criminal Court. However, as Paris points out, 
 
11  Khong, ‘Human security: A shotgun approach’, pp. 231–6. 
12  Khong, ‘Human security: A shotgun approach’, p. 233. 
13  Khong, ‘Human security: A shotgun approach’, p. 233. 
14  Khong, ‘Human security: A shotgun approach’, p. 234. 
15  Khong, ‘Human security: A shotgun approach’, p. 235. 
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wholism, inclusiveness and collective action are not substitutes for an 
analytical framework that guides research and practice.16  
Indeed, critics of the human-centric approach to security are often leaders 
of developing countries. They claim that the idea is merely another attempt 
by the West to impose its liberal values, which emphasise political rather 
than social and economic rights and which aim to undermine the principle 
of sovereignty and elevate humanitarian intervention.17 Although not 
necessarily expressed in the terms of the discipline, these arguments against 
the idea of human security are based on political leaders’ strong attachment 
to external and internal sovereignty as the basis for inter-state security and 
intra-state security and, although not made explicit, regime survival. 
Political elites and those IR scholars who reject human security agree, for 
different reasons, that establishing international and domestic stability has 
more to do with establishing order than with applying universal norms.  
The human-centric approach and critique of the traditional approach 
The arguments for a human-centric approach to security in the IR/SS 
literature can in part be located within ‘critical security’ studies, or the 
school of thought that challenges some or all of the traditional views about 
the meaning of security. Critical security scholars embrace a much 
broader understanding of security, which Keith Krause and others des-
cribe as having ‘three axes’.18 The first axis (the horizontal push) attempts 
to broaden the traditionalist’s narrow definition of security to include what 
is perceived as other types of threats to the state: such as economic, 
environmental, and unregulated population movements threats. The 
second, and related, axis (the vertical push) goes beyond the state-centric 
 
16  Paris, ‘Human security: Paradigm shift’. 
17  For descriptions of these arguments see Amitav Acharya, ‘Human security: East versus West’, IDSS 
Working Paper No. 17 (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, September 2001), pp. 
1–18; Mack, ‘Human security in the new millennium’. 
18  Keith Krause, ‘Theorizing security, state formation and the “Third World” in the post-Cold War 
world’, Review of International Studies 24(1) 1998, pp. 125–36, at p. 126; Sverre Lodgaard, ‘Human 
security: Concept and operationalisation’, paper presented at the Expert Seminar on Human Rights 
and Peace, Palais Wilson, Geneva, 8–9 December 2000, pp. 1–25; Jessica Tuchman Mathews, 
‘Redefining security’, Foreign Affairs 68(2) 1989, pp. 162–7; Caroline Thomas, In search of 
security: The Third World in international relations (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1987). 
8  PAULINE KERR  
 
focus above to deepen the concept of security to include other types of 
referents: at one end individual security (often called human security), at 
the other end, global security, and in between, regional and societal 
security. A third axis, still within the state-centric mold (and which 
concerns the means to enhance state security) endorses cooperation 
among security actors through common, cooperative, collective and 
comprehensive security approaches. This interpretation of the traditional 
approach is a useful descriptive account of the differences between the 
two perspectives. 
However, the most strident critique of the traditional approach is that it 
fails to recognise the normative human-centric dimensions of security. The 
liberal scholar Richard Falk places the idea of human security within 
‘visionary interpretations of human destiny’ which can be traced from 
earliest times to the present.19 Modernity, Falk argues, ‘situate[s] part of this 
visionary impetus within the secularised imagination of individuals and 
groups seeking to discover an autonomous pathway to a better, more secure 
and fulfilling, future for human societies’.20 Recent manifestations of this 
endeavour within the discipline include the various liberal world order 
studies, for example the mid-1960s World Order Models Project (WOMP), 
which Falk says were a reaction to the dominant realist world view and 
Machiavellianism.21  
The normative dimension of human security not only includes visionary 
interpretations of human destiny it also prescribes some empirical features 
for that vision. Ramesh Thakur, another well respected IR security scholar, 
argues the shift ‘from the state to the individual’ enhances the ‘quality of 
life’ of people. Human security has a negative and positive or a ‘double 
connotation’:  
 
19  Writing about the intellectual history of the quest for human security, Falk makes the point that the 
endeavour is part of the human condition, that ‘visionary interpretations of human destiny have 
always been an integral part of societal identity … This endeavor, in part, reflected the break 
between science and religion that was at the core of the European Enlightenment project’. Richard 
Falk, ‘Pursuing the quest for human security’, in Tehranian, ed., Worlds apart, pp. 1–22, at p. 1. 
20  Falk, ‘Pursuing the quest for human security’, p. 1. 
21  Falk lists other challenges to the realist picture: for example, Pugwash, Independent World 
Commissions, Global Conferences, Global Campaigns, and Law Making Treaties.  
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Negatively it refers to freedom from—from want, hunger, attack, torture, 
imprisonment without a free and fair trial, discrimination on spurious grounds 
and so on. Positively, it means freedom to—the capacity and opportunity that 
allows each human being to enjoy life to the fullest without imposing 
constraints upon others engaged in the same pursuit. Putting the two together, 
human security refers to the quality of life of the people of a society or polity. 
Anything that degrades their quality of life—demographic pressures, 
diminished access to or stocks of resources, etc—is a security concern. 
Conversely, anything that can upgrade their quality of life—economic growth, 
improved access to resources, social and political empowerment etc—is an 
enhancement of human security.22 
These critical security and strongly normative arguments in the IR/SS 
literature inform much, but not all, of the current human-centric critique of 
the traditional state-centric approach. Two of the best known critiques, 
derived from the development and humanitarian literatures, include these 
strong normative arguments and, most often, utilitarian and consequential 
arguments. 
The ‘development critique’ of the traditional approach 
The United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human develop-
ment report 199423 is often regarded as a major challenge to traditional 
views of security. Indeed, the report provides a definition of human 
security that is the one most commonly used not only by development 
scholars and practitioners, but also by IR/SS scholars. Human security 
means ‘first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and 
repression. And, second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful 
disruptions in the patterns of daily life—whether in homes, in jobs or in 
communities’.24 The threats to human security can be categorised, 
according to the report, under seven headings: economic security, food 
security, health security, environmental security, personal security, 
community security and political security.  
 
22  Ramesh Thakur, ‘Human security regimes’, in Tow, Thakur and Hyun, eds, Asia’s emerging regional 
order, p. 231. 
23  UNDP, Human development report 1994 (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 
1994), <hdr.undp.org/reports/view_reports.cfm?year=1994>. 
24  UNDP, Human development report 1994, p. 23. 
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Many advocates ardently defend this very broad definition of security.25 
From an IR perspective, or more precisely from a critical security studies 
position, its most important features are that it corrects the state-centric view 
of security and adds the much needed normative dimension. Introducing 
‘human’ elements of security, such as ‘hunger’ and ‘hurtful disruptions in 
the patterns of daily life’, extends the dominant security discourse well 
beyond the traditional, and by comparison, narrow view that security has 
several essential components: the protection of the state and national 
security; the primacy (or high-politics) of inter-relations between states; and 
the problem of physical threats or the use of military force by states against 
each other. Whereas this traditional concept stresses that the state is the 
referent object of security and that physical violence from outside sources is 
the main threat, the development concept of security stresses that human 
beings are the referent object and threats are often non-military and arise 
from many sources from within the state.  
From the development perspective, presenting the problems associated 
with human development in terms of human security is justified in 
normative, utilitarian and consequential terms. The first is that poverty and 
inequality in developing countries requires urgent attention.26 According to 
Michel Camdessus, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), ‘poverty is the ultimate systemic threat facing humanity’.27 In the 
post-Cold War period, reduced levels of aid from developing countries 
exacerbate poverty.28 Second, poverty and inequality are among the ‘root 
causes’ of conflict within states. War within states is more common than 
war between states and as a result civilian deaths are higher than combatant 
mortalities; more women and children are dying from war.29 Clearly, from 
 
25  See for example, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, ‘Human security: An intractable problem in Asia’, in 
Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian security order: Instrumental and normative features (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 536–67. 
26  Caroline Thomas, Global governance, development and human security: The challenge of poverty 
and inequality (London: Pluto Press, 2000), p. 3. 
27  Cited in Thomas, Global governance, p. 3. 
28  Rubens Ricardo, Cham Prasidh and Maria Livancos Attaui, ‘World’s poorest nations are 
marginalised’, Financial Times 9 May 2001. 
29  See the Centre for Systemic Peace website for statistical evidence of this development 
<www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/peace.htm>. 
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the development perspective, relief from the injustices of economic and 
social poverty is at the centre of the need to reconceptualise security. 
Moreover, the imperative to protect people from the harms of under-
development within states is necessary for the survival of all people. A 
senior development official in the United Nations, Mahbub ul-Haq, 
emphasises the new moral and international repercussions of not acting. 
‘Human security’, he points out, ‘is a powerful revolutionary idea that 
forces a new morality on all of us through a perception of common threats 
to our very survival’. From ul-Haq’s perspective, ‘[t]he consequences of 
poverty, disease, drugs, pollution do not stop at borders’.30  
In effect the development view challenges the state-centric approach to 
security in several ways: by downplaying the prospects of inter-state in the 
post-Cold War era; elevating the many injustices of underdevelopment; 
assuming that these injustices have moral and practical imperatives for all 
humans and states wherever they are; and by stressing the interconnec-
tedness between poverty and conflict within the state for internal and 
external security. Furthermore, securitising the human development agenda 
in this way also has utilitarian effects, not least of which is to move attention 
and resources away from the state-centric agenda.  
The ‘humanitarian critique’ of the traditional approach  
The second major critique of the traditional approach to security is based 
on normative and legal arguments supportive of humanitarian principles. 
From this perspective, for example, the traditional approach to security 
ignores the security of people, in a variety of dire situations. In particular 
it fails to directly support humanitarian international law that seeks to 
prevent and protect people suffering harms perpetrated by the state. At the 
centre of this body of law is the concept of human rights and the three 
generations of rights law: (a) civil and political rights; (b) economic, 
social and cultural rights; and (c) collective rights. These rights have been 
formalised, for example, in the 1945 United Nations Charter, the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1993 Vienna Declarations,31 
 
30  Mahbub ul-Haq, ‘Global governance for human security’, in Tehranian, ed., Worlds apart, p. 83. 
31  Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, International Human Rights Instruments, 
<193.194.138.190/html/intlinst.htm>.  
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and the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide.32 These various conventions are binding on states and 
legitimise international scrutiny of the interaction between the state and 
people. 
This humanitarian focus is the quintessential normative element of the 
human-centric approach. The close connection between human security and 
human rights is a corrective to the state-centric focus and a reinforcement of 
the normative elements of security. According to some human security 
advocates, establishing the link between human security and human rights 
can enrich both.33 Placing human security in the human rights context 
attaches to it the ‘notion of correlative rights’.34 In addition, if human 
security is seen to be as important as national security then human rights 
cannot ‘so easily be neglected in the name of security’. Human security 
considerations might also help to resolve conflicting human rights.35  
For some, however, making connections between human security and 
human rights is a fundamental flaw. Many critics in the developing world, 
who may nonetheless support some aspects of the human development 
dimensions of human security, object to the inclusion of human rights if it 
means that state rights, or the right to external and internal sovereignty, 
becomes conditional upon Western formulations of human rights, in 
particular political and civil rights. This objection seems to have increased 
since the 1999 statement by the UN Secretary General (see below) 
confirming that genocide and extensive abuses of human rights are reasons 
for overruling sovereignty and for justifying military intervention. 
The humanitarian critique also highlights the failure of state-centric 
approaches to consider other areas of international law which legislate 
against the principle of physical harm to people in a variety of other 
 
32  Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide, <www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm>. 
33  Ellen Seidensticker, ‘Human security, human rights, and human development’, Commission of Human 
Security, 5 February 2002, <www.humansecuritychs.org/activities/outreach/0206harvard.pdf>, accessed 
20 July 2002. 
34  Seidensticker, ‘Human security’. 
35  Seidensticker, ‘Human security’. 
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situations. Examples of such international law include: (a) international 
humanitarian law (IHL) which in wartime protects people who are no 
longer participants in the hostilities;36 (b) the establishment of three 
international tribunalsone of which is permanentto ‘try persons 
accused of violations of international law, including humanitarian law’;37 
(c) the UN resolutions that establish standards for the protection of civilians 
during internal conflict;38 (d) a UN aide memoire for ‘consideration of 
issues pertaining to the protection of civilians during the Security Council’s 
deliberations of peacekeeping mandates’;39 and (e) the UN resolutions 
against terrorism.40  
 
36  The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their two Additional Protocols of 1977 are the principle 
instruments of humanitarian law. In addition there is a body of universal customary rules, reflecting 
the treaty-based norms, that is binding on all states regardless of ratification. According to Jakob 
Kellenberger, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), ‘this customary 
law offers or, rather should offer, a measure of security in situations where the treaties do not 
formally apply or where the rules are less developed, especially in non-international conflicts’. See 
Jakob Kellenberger, ‘International humanitarian law at the beginning of the 21st century’, statement 
to the 26th Round Table in San Remo, 5–7 September 2002. 
37  The two tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) are mechanisms not only for punishing crimes against humanity but also, it is hoped, for 
preventing such events by deterrence. The UN Security Council voted unanimously on 12 July 2002 
that the ICC be established. See Kellenberger, ‘International humanitarian law at the beginning of 
the 21st century’. 
38  UN Security Council Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2002/6), 15 March 2002, <ods-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/288/93/IMG/N0228893.pdf?OpenElement>, accessed 21 October 
2002. 
39  These are decided on a case-by-case basis but also suggest that such considerations should go 
beyond peacekeeping. The aide memoire states that ‘most frequently civilians are caught in 
circumstances of dire need where a peacekeeping operation has not been established. Such situations 
may require the urgent attention by the Council’. The aide memoire for Protection of Civilians in 
Armed Conflict sets out around a dozen areas for consideration: for example, access to vulnerable 
populations; separation of civilians and armed elements; justice and reconciliation; security, law and 
order; disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and rehabilitation, small arms and mine action; 
effects on women and children; and so on. UN Security Council Presidential Statement 
(S/PRST/2002/6).  
40  Among the many recent and past resolutions passed by the General Assembly, are A/RES/54/164 
and A/RES/48/122. The latter expresses that the General Assembly is ‘seriously concerned at the 
gross violations of human rights perpetrated by terrorist groups’. This resolution makes it clear that 
both states and people that commit terrorist acts against both states and people are condemned. The 
resolution ‘unequivocally condemns all acts, methods and practices of terrorism in all its forms and 
manifestations, wherever and by whomever committed, as activities aimed at the destruction of 
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In addition to the critique of the traditional approach from normative, 
utilitarian and consequential viewpoints, the human-centric approach has 
several advantages for conceptualising security. In contrast to traditional 
approaches it offers insights into the cause of violence within the states, 
such as civil war. It provides an important focus on the nexus between the 
different dimensions of human security (for example, the nexus between the 
harms of underdevelopment and political violence). It sets formal and 
informal benchmarks for practical prosecution of offenders of human 
security and it can act as a deterrent. It also acts as a political organising 
umbrella. As an organising concept it can collect many of the threats to 
humans under one name even if it cannot necessarily say why these 
particular threats were singled out as especially important for human 
security. Another effect of human security is that it provides political glue 
among its many different actors. The increasing number of non-state actors, 
each of which believes their particular issue is the most urgent to resolve 
and each of which competes for state and private funding and intellectual 
resources, are glued together by an open-ended concept whose vision of 
what ‘ought-to-be’ is one that no one could reject.  
The ‘in-camp critique’ of the human-centric approach 
Advocates of the human-centric approach would have little disagreement 
with the above critique of the state-centric approach. Nonetheless, there 
are differences within the camp. There is scepticism about the prospects of 
setting practical agendas when the scope of the human security agenda is 
as vast and wide-ranging as that set out in the Human development report 
1994, and when there appears to be no conceptually binding link between 
all the different aspects of human security. There is also the concern that it 
is difficult to prioritise issues without some agreed criteria, adding to the 
problems of practice.  
These concerns about the practical feasibility of researching and 
formulating practical agendas for human security have led some scholars 
 
human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy, threatening the territorial integrity and security 
of States, destabilizing legitimately constituted Governments, undermining pluralistic civil society 
and having adverse consequences on the economic and social development of States’. See ‘Human 
rights and terrorism’, A/RES/48/122, <www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r122.htm>. For the full 
range of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, see <www.un.org/terrorism/sc.htm>.  
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towards narrower understandings of the concept, in terms of threats and 
means. For example, Andrew Mack, Chair of Human Security at the 
University of British Columbia, is head of the Human Security Report 
Project that maps the incidence, causes, consequences and policy responses 
to global violence—criminal as well as political.41 For Mack this narrower 
focus on political and criminal violence is justified because for the 
purposes of analysis, poverty and violence, for example, must be treated 
independently. As he explains, ‘[a]ny definition that has the consequences 
of conflating dependent and independent variables makes causal analysis 
virtually impossible’.42 A similar concern about the scope of the concept 
apparently led to the recent decision by the Commission of Human Security 
(see below) to divide their research agenda into two related parts: conflict 
and human security, and development and human security.43 
There is also a division within the human-centric camp over ends and 
means.44 Many advocates take a strong normative position and argue that 
human security is the only end, that state security is a means, never an end. 
Others take a more flexible position arguing that ends and means are not 
necessarily at odds with each other. While the end is human security, in 
some instances pursuing state security can also be an end that benefits both 
the state and people.  
In reviewing the various critiques made by each approach to security, 
several points seem clear. From the state-centric perspective the main 
problems with human-centric approaches are that, from a disciplinary 
perspective they conflict with the dominant boundaries of the discipline of 
 
41  The first report is due to be published in late 2003. See the Canadian Consortium on Human Security 
website <www.humansecurity.info>.  
42  Andrew Mack, ‘The human security report project’, draft copy sent to author June 2002. Also see 
<www.humansecurity.info>.  
43  See the Commission on Human Security (CHS) website, <www.humansecurity-chs.org>. The CHS 
is an independent body, founded by the UN, with a grant provided by the Japanese government.  
44  See the exchange between Alex J. Bellamy and Matt McDonald, ‘“The utility of human security”: 
Which humans? What security? A reply to Thomas & Tow’, Security Dialogue 33(3) 2002, pp. 373–
7; and Nicholas Thomas and William T. Tow, ‘Gaining security by trashing the state? A reply to 
Bellamy & McDonald’, Security Dialogue 33(3) 2002, pp. 379–82. For the original article that 
started the exchange see Nicholas Thomas and William T. Tow, ‘The utility of human security: 
Sovereignty and humanitarian intervention’, Security Dialogue 33(2) 2002, pp. 177–92.  
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IR/SS, which focus on the external security relations between states and on 
establishing international order. Conceptually, bringing in other definitions 
of security, such as human security, will make the concept meaningless. The 
broad definitions of human security provide little direction for research and 
policy decisions. In practice focusing on the internal security issues will 
have the effect of undermining the principle of sovereignty which is critical 
for maintaining international order.  
From the human-centric perspective security concerns people and it 
incorporates a state’s internal issues when people are suffering serious 
harms, for example from underdevelopment and neglect of humanitarian 
principles, and when the state does not act to correct these problems. The 
security of people is a normative issue in its own right but it also has 
practical consequences for internal and international order. Hence, internal 
and external security issues are interrelated.  
The various critiques suggest that an ideal-type approach to concep-
tualising and practicing security would in principle comprise several 
propositions: people and the state are referent objects; threats have internal 
and external dimensions and involve organised political violence often 
associated with underdevelopment factors; the means for enhancing security 
involve a range of measures that deal with the various threats mentioned; 
and finally, many of these issues are connected and interact with each other, 
perhaps in a dialectic.  
AN EVOLVING SECURITY DIALECTIC?  
The critiques above have helped to further clarify the differences between 
the traditional and human security positions. Many scholars would doubt 
that more than this had been achieved.45 However, I suggest three hypo-
theses indicate that something more is happening. First, the discussions 
are also encouraging some scholars to compare the two approaches, to 
consider the advantages and disadvantages, the virtues and flaws and the 
strengths and weaknesses of each perspective. As a result it is now 
possible to find scholarship that appears to recognise some of the ideal-
type propositions mentioned above. Second, some of this scholarship not 
 
45  See the earlier discussion about the criticisms of human security. 
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only appreciates that there are different dimensions of security but also 
that there is a dialectic between them. Third, there is a nascent attempt to 
develop, often unreflectively, a middle path or via media between the 
state-centric and human-centric approaches.  
The idea that there is considerable interaction between different 
approaches to international relations has a precedent within the discipline. 
Martin Wight, a scholar from the English School, argues that the writers of 
international theory follow three traditions: realists are those ‘who 
emphasise and concentrate upon the element of international anarchy, the 
Rationalists those who emphasise and concentrate on the elements of 
international discourses, and Revolutionists are those who emphasise and 
concentrate upon the element of the society of states or intellectual 
society.’46 He is emphatic that the traditions ‘are streams, with eddies and 
cross-currents, sometimes interlacing and never for long confined to their 
own river bed … They influence and cross-fertilise one another and they 
change although without, I think, losing their inner identity’.47 Wight’s 
metaphor is indicative of a dialectic which is continued in his claim that the 
great writers of international theory ‘straddle the frontiers dividing two of 
the traditions, and most of these writers transcend their own systems’.48 
Wight also considers the idea of a via media, arguing that it is the rationalist 
tradition which is ‘the broad middle road’.49 A. Clare Cutler neatly sums up 
Wight’s apparent emphasis on movement between traditions and a middle 
way, or via media, in her statement that he has an ‘inability to embrace any 
one single formulation’.50  
 
46  Martin Wight, International theory: The three traditions, eds Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter 
(Leicester and London: Leicester University Press, 1991), pp. 7–8. 
47  Wight, International theory, p. 260. 
48  Wight, International theory, p. 259. 
49  Wight, International theory, p. 14.  
50  A. Claire Cutler, ‘The “Grotian tradition” in international relations’, Review of International Studies 
17(1) 1991, pp. 41–65, at p. 52. 
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Although Wight’s focus is at the international level he is mindful that 
individuals are at the core of international security.51 That said, he seems to 
assume, erroneously in some circumstances, that not only is international 
society the best way to preserve state security but that states will protect 
their citizens not just from the external harm of military force but also from 
internal harms of physical violence.52 With these qualifications we can draw 
from Wight the idea that international relations theory involves interaction, 
or a dialectic, as well as a middle way, or via media, between different 
traditions.  
Wight’s view that writers often ‘straddle the frontiers dividing two of the 
traditions, and most of these writers transcend their own systems’ is 
reflected in the writings of several IR/SS scholars over the last three to four 
years.53 These scholars, just as Cutler remarked of Wight, show an ‘inability 
to embrace any one single formulation’.54 Four academic works by well-
known scholars, Sverre Lodgaard, William Tow and Nicholas Thomas, 
Dewi Fortuna Anwar and Astri Suhrke, demonstrate, I suggest, that there 
are security dialectics between the state-centric and human-centric 
approaches and, to a much lesser extent, via medias. In making this 
argument the ideal-type propositions that evolved from an examination of 
earlier critiques will be adopted as the basis for analysis. 
A security dialectic between states and people as referent objects (proposition 
one) 
Interestingly all the works either explicitly or implicitly confirmed this 
proposition. Lodgaard argues that ‘as the dust of the conceptual debate in 
the early 1990s settles’ it is now clear that the concepts of state security 
 
51  Martin Wight, ‘Western values in international relations’, in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, 
eds, Diplomatic investigations: Essays in the theory of international politics (London: George Allen 
& Unwin Ltd, 1966), pp. 89–131, at p. 101.  
52  Hedley Bull also seems to assume that the state will protect its people within. He is unconvinced that 
individuals should be entitled to address their insecurity through claims for human rights. He argues 
that ‘carried to its logical extreme, the doctrine of human rights and duties under international law is 
subversive of the whole principle that mankind should be organised as society of states’. Hedley 
Bull, The anarchical society: A study of order in world politics (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 152. 
53  Wight, International theory, p. 259. 
54  Cutler, ‘The “Grotian tradition”’, p. 52. 
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and human security will be ‘the concepts that security policies will be 
organised around for a long time ahead’.55 Hence Lodgaard proposes a 
reconceptualisation of the idea of security as a ‘dual concept of state 
security and human security’.56 Security involves both. Security of states, 
or national security, concerns defence of ‘territorial integrity of the state 
and freedom to determine one’s own form of government’.57 Security of 
states, at the global level, is possible but not always probable, through 
collective security, sometimes through collective defence. Security of the 
people involves a widening of the idea of security, from the exclusive 
reserve of security of the state, to the security of people. Furthermore, he 
argues, the objective of human security is the safety and survival of 
people, or in other words freedom from fear of physical violence.58  
Thomas and Tow59 imply rather than assert that the state and people are 
referent objects. The authors claim, that their objective is ‘assessing how the 
evolution of human security might proceed in ways that co-exist with more 
traditional approaches, rather than advocating the former outlook’s 
complete revision’, implies dual referents.60 However, Thomas and Tow are 
primarily focused on analysing how internal threats arising from under-
development can spill-over borders and destabilise relations between states. 
Hence, they embrace the human-centric approach primarily as a means for 
preventing internal issues arising that undermine the state-centric approach 
to security. Nonetheless, the human-centric approach is present in the 
 
55  Lodgaard refers to the empirical developments that have led to support for the view expressed in the 
1995 Report on the Commission for Global Governance which makes a distinction between the 
security of states and people[s]. This followed collective security interventions on behalf of the UN, 
for example in Iraq (1991) and Somalia (1992–93) where the costs to humans, that is civilians, 
caused by the state and in the absence of the state respectively, indicated that security had widened 
qualitatively, or in terms of the referent object. Lodgaard, ‘Human security: Concept and 
operationalisation’, pp. 1–2. 
56  Lodgaard, ‘Human security: Concept and operationalisation’, p. 6. 
57  Lodgaard, ‘Human security: Concept and operationalisation’, p. 1. 
58  Lodgaard, ‘Human security: Concept and operationalisation’, p. 6. 
59  Thomas and Tow, ‘The utility of human security’, p. 189.  
60  Thomas and Tow, ‘The utility of human security’, p. 179, emphasis in original. 
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analysis of causes and in the effects of spill-over conflict on the security of 
people in other states.  
Anwar’s argument that ‘human rights are regarded as universal values 
that must be protected universally’ and that ‘at the same time … the 
existence of states is critical for the protection of human security’ indicates 
that both people and the state are important referent objects.61 She is explicit 
that ‘state security and human security must not be seen as antagonistic. 
Instead they should be regarded as a continuum—each reinforcing the 
other’.62 Her key argument is that ‘[t]here can be no real security for the 
state if its people are not secure’.63 
Suhrke provides a different way of examining the relationship between 
the state and human-centric approaches.64 Her theoretical focus suggests a 
constitutive relationship between the norm of human security and national 
interests and it therefore assumes connections and dialectics between the 
state and people referent objects. Like Thomas and Tow, she shows that 
state-centric approaches, or neorealist interests, can be behind a state’s 
endorsement of human-centric approaches.65 However, Suhrke’s main point 
is that this neorealist perspective cannot answer why the idea of human 
security, rather than state security, is selected by these countries ‘as a 
guarantor of human rights and humanitarian benefits’.66 For Suhrke, the 
introduction and now centrality of human security in Canadian and 
Norwegian foreign policy, shows that ‘norms shape the interests of states in 
at least two ways: by influencing the definition of interests, and by 
influencing their order of priority’.67 Humanitarian ideas, such as human 
security, have ‘become the principal normative reference for states and 
 
61  Anwar, ‘Human security: An intractable problem’, p. 564. 
62  Anwar, ‘Human security: An intractable problem’, p. 565. 
63  Anwar, ‘Human security: An intractable problem’, p. 565. 
64  Astri Suhrke, ‘Human security and the interests of states’, Security Dialogue 30(3) 1999, pp. 265–
76, at p. 268. 
65  Suhrke suggests the Norwegian–Canadian endorsement of human security ‘can to some extent be 
explained in this perspective’. Suhrke, ‘Human security and the interests of states’, p. 268. 
66  Suhrke, ‘Human security and the interests of states’, p. 265. 
67  Suhrke, ‘Human security and the interests of states’, p. 265. 
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organisations to clarify their international obligations, or against which to 
hold others responsible’.68 Hence, if states foreign policy is partly 
constituted through reference to the norm of human security then it is also 
possible to argue that there is a security dialectic between the referent 
objects of state and people.  
Threats and means: A dialectic between threats located inside and outside 
the state and between threats of violence and non-violent factors (proposition 
two) 
The mixture of means: Force, humanitarian principles and development 
(proposition three) 
The second proposition, that security threats are located inside and outside 
the state and comprise both violent and non-violent factors, applies to all 
the works being examined. Likewise the third proposition, that the means 
for enhancing security are mixed. For Lodgaard, the threats to people 
mostly concern physical violence.69 He justifies his limitation to fear of 
physical violence and the obvious fact that it ‘corresponds to the core of 
state security’.70 Without such limits, he argues, ‘the concept becomes all-
inclusive and therefore empty of content … [and] the issues and their 
solutions do not necessarily benefit from being securitised’.71 He 
nonetheless adds flexibility under certain conditions, saying that ‘[t]hreats 
and means vary with time and space and there is not uniformity in their 
inclusion in or exclusion from the security paradigm’.72 With regard to 
means, Lodgaard suggests a mixture of force and other non-violent 
measures. The three core elements on the policy agenda of human security 
are: (a) preventive actions (eliminating factors that compromise freedom 
from fear); (b) addressing the means of violence (small arms and light 
 
68  Suhrke, ‘Human security and the interests of states’, p. 269. 
69  Lodgaard, ‘Human security: Concept and operationalisation’, p. 6. 
70  Both of them centre on material means, usually referred to as military force in the context of state 
security, physical violence in the case of human security. Lodgaard, ‘Human security: Concept and 
operationalisation’, p. 9. 
71  Lodgaard, ‘Human security: Concept and operationalisation’, p. 6. 
72  Lodgaard, ‘Human security: Concept and operationalisation’, p. 6.  
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weapons); and (c) joint efforts by government and non-government actors, 
especially during peace operations.73 
The particular threats that Thomas and Tow examine are ‘transnational 
threats’ but specifically those that arise from problems of underdevelopment 
and which threaten both people within and in other states and which 
undermine international peace and stability. As mentioned above, the main 
focus is on threats to the state-to-state relations from human insecurities. 
The main means for addressing what amounts to multiple threats to people 
and state, is the state. In their view ‘in order for human security to be 
advanced, at least in the short term, it must be embodied by states that 
overwhelmingly remain the predominant agents of international relations in 
our time’.74 However the authors caution that the state can be ‘a critical 
determinant of human security or human insecurity’.75 Thus the means for 
addressing transnational threats to people and states also involves 
international intervention involving other states but also non-state actors 
from international civil society. International intervention consists of 
peacekeeping, involving the use of force, and peacebuilding involving non-
state actors. As they say, ‘in this context, human security politics dovetails 
with more traditional (state-centric) responses to crises’.76 
For Anwar there are threats to both people and the state. The Human 
development report 1994, she argues shows that ‘to focus only on the 
security of the state, particularly on the military threat to state security is to 
miss the whole range of threats that make human existence unbearable’.77 
At the same time she recognises that the state, especially Asian states during 
the post-colonial period, confronts ‘external enemies’ and transnational 
threats. Anwar is most concerned about human security as an ‘intractable 
problem’ in Asia and her suggested means involve establishing democracy 
 
73  Lodgaard, ‘Human security: Concept and operationalisation’, pp. 15–24. 
74  Thomas and Tow, ‘Gaining security by trashing the state?’, p. 381. 
75  Thomas and Tow, ‘Gaining security by trashing the state?’, p. 380. 
76  Thomas and Tow, ‘The utility of human security’, p. 183.  
77  Anwar, ‘Human security: An intractable problem’, p. 564. 
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to address internal political violence and greater involvement by regional 
institutions with transnational issues.78 
A security dialectic between internal and external security (proposition 
four) 
All the works examined confirm the proposition that internal and external 
security issues are interrelated and there are dialectics between them. For 
Lodgaard, human, state and international security are interconnected and 
states’ legitimacy increasingly depends on adherence to international 
law and attention to domestic conflicts, since most have external 
consequences.79 Thomas and Tow emphasise that ‘security politics as a 
whole should be seen as a mix of domestic and international issues’.80 
Anwar argues that human security ‘links the various domains of security’ 
in ways that show it is ‘no longer possible to draw a rigid line between 
internal and external matters’.81 
In sum the scholarly works discussed above demonstrate, in my view, 
that some scholars are adopting a conceptualisation of security that is 
similar to the ideal-type proposition that was constructed from the two 
security critiques of the state-centric and human-centric approaches. There 
are dual referent objects, the state and people, and dialectics between them. 
Interestingly then, there is a widening of referent objects in comparison to 
traditional approaches but a narrowing in comparison to some non-
traditional and human-centric approaches that do not limit referents. If there 
are dual referent objects it follows that there is also a widening of means to 
enhance the security. The use of force is a critical means for countering 
external military threats and violent internal threats to people, either from 
communal groups or the state. Non-military means are equally important in 
situations where physical violence is caused by the conditions associated 
with underdevelopment. Interestingly although there are dual referent 
 
78  Suhrke’s argument about interests and norms is not focused on issues of threats and means and 
therefore will not be discussed. 
79  Lodgaard, ‘Human security: Concept and operationalisation’, p. 3. 
80  Thomas and Tow, ‘The utility of human security’, p. 183.  
81  Anwar, ‘Human security: An intractable problem’, p. 565. 
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objects, the nature of threats in the works discussed is usually limited to 
political violence to people or the state. This political violence, as Tow and 
Thomas suggest, is often in a causal dialectic with problems of under-
development. Internal violence, as Tow and Thomas also suggest, has 
destabilising transnational effects. These interconnections demonstrate a 
security dialectic between the referent objects, internal and external threats, 
and the means for enhancing security. 
THE AGENTS OF SECURITY  
The discussion above is largely a conceptual elaboration. The question it 
raises is, to what extent are the ideal-type propositions regarding security 
dialectics and referent objects, threats and means applicable to the 
practices of security agents, such as global institutions, states and non-
state actors?  
Several global institutions and states endorse the proposition that the 
state and people are referent objects. The UN, particularly its current 
Secretary General, Kofi Annan,82 is one of the strongest advocates of 
human-centric approaches. In several speeches and major policy 
statements, Annan appears to link the various levels of global, state and 
people security and argues for ‘Two concepts of sovereignty’—state and 
human sovereignty. ‘Two concepts of sovereignty’ was the title of Annan’s 
speech to the General Assembly on 18 September 1999, in which he 
attempted to redress the balance favouring state security, particularly when 
states fail to uphold human security. He argues that: 
States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their 
peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time individual sovereignty—by 
which I mean the fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the 
charter of the UN and subsequent treaties—has been enhanced by a renewed 
 
82  Annan’s predecessor Boutros Boutros-Ghali had advocated change to the way that state sovereignty 
was conceptualised: ‘The foundation stone of this work is and must remain the State. Respect for its 
fundamental sovereignty and integrity is crucial to any common international progress. The time for 
absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory never matched by reality’. An 
agenda for peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping, Report of the Secretary 
General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 
January 1992, reprinted in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, eds, United Nations, divided 
world: The UN’s role in international relations, new expanded edition (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993), pp. 468–98, at p. 474. 
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and spreading consciousness of individual rights … Nothing in the UN charter 
precludes a recognition that there are rights beyond borders … Humanity, 
after all is indivisible … In the context of many of the challenges facing 
humanity today, the collective interest is the national interest.83 
A year later when the Secretary General presented the UN’s Millennium 
Report, which significantly he titled ‘We the peoples’, he again advised 
member states of the General Assembly to redress the balance and to ‘think 
of security less in terms of merely defending territory, and more in terms of 
protecting people’.84 In the text of the report, Annan argued that ‘a new 
concept of security is evolving … [which has] come to embrace protection 
of communities and individuals from internal violence’.85 Protection may 
involve ‘armed action’. It is this possibility that the Secretary General states, 
is ‘a real dilemma’, since ‘both the defence of humanitarian and the defence 
of sovereignty are principles that must be supported’ and there is nothing 
that tells us ‘which principle should prevail when they are in conflict’. 
Nonetheless, Annan is sure that ‘no legal principle—not even sovereignty—
can ever shield crimes against humanity’ and hence under these conditions 
he makes human security the primary referent object. 
Notwithstanding Annan’s attempts to elevate human-centric concep-
tualisations of security, in practice the UN is made up of sovereign states all 
endorsing state-centric approaches. Indeed, James Gow argues that UN 
actions are driven by concerns about international order. For Gow, when ‘an 
internal matter affects other states in the international community then 
neither the UNSC, on behalf of the system as a whole, nor the relevant 
affected states can afford to have their own vested interest in a viable, stable 
order undermined, whether this is in terms of material or ideational 
interests’.86 
 
83  The Economist 18 September 1999, pp. 49–50. 
84  ‘We the peoples: The role of the United Nations in the 21st century’, <www.un.org/millennium/ 
sg/report/state.htm>, p. 4. 
85  <www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/ch3.htm>. 
86  James Gow, ‘A revolution in international affairs?’, Security Dialogue 31(3) 2000, pp. 293–306, at 
p. 296. 
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The UN’s support for both the security of the state and people is also 
similar to the approach adopted by two other major global institutions, the 
World Bank and the IMF. The World Bank President, James Wolfensohn, 
while still supporting the state, argues that prevention of conflict between 
and within states depends on alleviating the conditions of underdevelop-
ment, especially poverty. An indication of the Bank’s concern about conflict 
and poverty was that the President for the first time addressed the UN 
Security Council on 10 January 2000 and emphasised that ‘to prevent 
violent conflict we need a comprehensive, equitable and inclusive approach 
to development’.87 The IMF approaches security mainly in economic 
terms88 by addressing the connections between low growth, poverty and 
violence, but also considers the states responsibility to support human rights 
as critical elements towards that end.89  
Like the UN, an increasing number of countries are making human-
centric approaches part of their traditional state-centric foreign policies. 
Perhaps the best known position is Canada’s which was developed and 
widely presented by the former Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy. The 
most comprehensive official account, Freedom from fear: Canada’s foreign 
policy for human security was published by Canada’s Department of 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade in 2000.90 Here it is argued that ‘the 
 
87  ‘Wolfensohn calls for “war on AIDS”’, News release no 2000/172/S, <web.worldbank.org/ 
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20016179~menuPK:34463~pagePK:34370~piPK:3
4424~theSitePK:4607,00.html>, accessed 28 February 2001. 
88  The First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, Anne Kruger, claims that ‘supporting globalisation 
is one of the best investments we can make to improve today’s security environment’. The IMF’s 
security focus is on the ‘cycle of violence, low growth and poverty’. See ‘Assistance to post-conflict 
countries and the HIPC framework’, paper prepared jointly by the staffs on the World Bank and 
IMF, 20 April 2001, pp. 1–29, <www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2002/092602a.htm>, accessed 14 
October 2002. 
89  The IMF claims that ‘all of the IMF’s activities contribute directly or indirectly to reducing poverty 
and fostering human rights’. However, states that ‘display egregious disrespect for human rights find 
that the international community is unwilling to provide the financial resources necessary to make 
their adjustment programs viable. In such cases, the IMF would be unable to assist the countries’. 
See Sergio Pereira Leite, ‘Human rights and the IMF’, Finance and Development 38(4) 2001, 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/12/leite.htm>, accessed 14 October 2002. 
90  Freedom from fear: Canada’s foreign policy for human security (Ottawa: Department of  
Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2000), <pubx.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/00_Global/Pubs_Cat2.nsf/ 
189d2b90aa3c50cb88256a4900709038/56153893ff8dfda285256bc700653b9f?OpenDocument>. 
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concept of peace and security—national, regional and global—makes sense 
only if it derived from individual security … This is what we mean by 
human security’.91 From the Canadian perspective, national and human 
security are ‘complementary’.92 But when states are not ‘guarantors of 
human security … when [they] are internally repressive or too weak to 
govern effectively, people suffer. In the face of massive state-sponsored 
murder, the calculated brutalization of people and appalling violations of 
human rights, the humanitarian imperative to act cannot be ignored and can, 
in some cases, outweigh concerns about sovereignty’.93 Like the UN, 
Canada makes human security the primary referent under certain 
conditions.  
There is growing interest in human-centric approaches among many 
other states. Norway,94 Japan,95 and states in the OECD96 all incorporate, 
albeit it in different ways, various elements. In addition at least some 13 
countries have become members of the Human Security Network.97 The 
chair for 2002–03, Austria, has set an agenda during this period on human 
rights education and addressing the plight of children in armed conflicts.98  
Even though over the last decade more and more governments have 
become committed to the idea of human security in its various formulations 
there is little evidence that these states put less emphasis on their own 
traditional state-centric approaches, either conceptually or in practice. 
 
91  Freedom from fear, p. 1. 
92  Freedom from fear, p. 3. 
93  Freedom from fear, p. 3. 
94  Suhrke, ‘Human security and the interests of states’.  
95 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Diplomatic bluebook 2000: Toward the 21st century: Foreign 
policy for a better future (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2000), <www.mofa.go.jp/ 
policy/other/bluebook/2000/II-3-a.html>.  
96  ‘Helping prevent violent conflict: Orientations for external partners’, <www.oecd.org//dac/htm/g-
con.htm>, p. 2. 
97  As of June 2001, the members of the Human Security Network include Austria, Canada, Chile, 
Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, South Africa (observer), 
Switzerland and Thailand. See Human Security Network News Bulletin 1(1) 2001, 
<www.hsph.harvard.edu/hpcr/hsn/news_bulletin_v1_i1.pdf>.  
98  See Human Security Network News Bulletin, p. 2. 
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Apparently many policy makers in these states are uncertain about what is 
actually meant by human security and exactly what guidance it provides for 
practical approaches and setting priorities. Harvard academic, Gary King 
points out that when he and a colleague were preparing a study on human 
security they ‘conducted informal and off-the-record interviews with 
politicians and officials responsible for the foreign policy in several 
countries that describe their policy as in some way based on human 
security’.99 And as King discovered, ‘[v]irtually every person we spoke 
with was concerned that there existed no widely accepted or coherent 
definition of human security and that there were considerable conceptual 
problems in relating human security, human development, and the 
development focus on poverty together in the articulation of their foreign 
policy’.100 
Apart from some confusion about the meaning of human security the 
most obvious point is that countries endorsing human security continue to 
endorse traditional state-centric approaches to security, especially in defence 
policy. Canada, which appears to have the strongest commitment and the 
most developed human security policy of all countries, did not under its 
most ardent proponent, Lloyd Axworthy, ‘reflect or even acknowledge the 
new doctrines of human security and peace-building’ in its defence 
policies.101 While the level of combat capability required for the pursuit of 
human security beyond Canada’s borders is a matter of debate, according to 
Project Ploughshares, the current multipurpose combat capable air, land and 
maritime force structure is not necessarily equipped to conduct ‘the 
 
99 Gary King and Christopher Murray, ‘Rethinking human security’, 4 May 2000, 
<gking.harvard.edufiles/hs.pdf>.  
100 King and Murray, ‘Rethinking human security’. 
101 Project Plowshares, ‘Human security and military procurement: A Project Ploughshares’ brief to the 
House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran Affairs’, Ploughshares 
Working Paper 99-1 (Ontario: Project Ploughshares, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Conrad 
Grebel College, 27 May 1999), p. 1, <www.ploughshares.ca/content/ WORKING%20PAPERS/ 
wp991.html>, accessed 28 March 2001. According to the Canadian Chief of Land Staff, in 1999 
Canadian Forces had been deployed on 65 missions over the last decade compared to some 25 missions 
over the previous 40 years. See D.Net Newsroom, ‘Lgen W. Leach, ‘“CF perspectives on human 
security”’, 5 November 1999, <www.dnd.ca/site/newsroom/ view_news_e.asp?id=457>, accessed 
8 March 2001. 
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imperatives of human security articulated and advanced by DFAIT’.102 
Military capital spending during 1999–2000 to 2001–02 remains steady 
whereas non-military spending has fallen.103 Again according to the 
Ploughshares Project, ‘[i]ronically precisely when peace-building and 
human security concerns have been most forcefully articulated in Canada as 
key to advancing international peace and security, funding for development 
and for non-military approaches to human security has been in precipitous 
decline’.104 Moreover, according to the North-South Institute,105 not-
withstanding Canada’s leadership in eliminating landmines it continues to 
use the command-detonated Claymore antipersonnel mine and, not-
withstanding strict controls on small arms, it continues to ‘export military 
goods to countries where armed conflict persists or whose governments 
have been cited for human rights violations’.106 Equally telling is that from 
the perspective of the Canadian Chief of Land Staff, LtGen W. Leach, peace 
has not broken out in the post-Cold War period, indeed, ‘for the military, 
nothing has disappeared but the list has just got longer!’.107  
Japan’s endorsement of human security now coincides with the Japanese 
Self Defence Force (JSDF) playing unprecedented operations on foreign 
soil under the auspices of UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs).108 The 
JSDF participated in UNPKOs in Cambodia, the Golan Heights, 
Mozambique, East Timor and most recently, under recent anti-terrorist 
 
102 Project Plowshares, ‘Human security and military procurement’, p. 5.  
103 The average is C$1.99 billion, which represents the average of 19.1 per cent of the total military 
budget. See Project Plowshares, ‘Human security and military procurement’, p. 5. 
104 Project Plowshares, ‘Human security and military procurement’, p. 2. According to Project 
Plowshares, ‘in the 1990s, development spending has been cut by fully one-third. It is down now 
[1999] to roughly 0.3% of GNP despite a formal commitment to a target of 0.7% of GNP’. 
105 The North-South Institute is an independent, charitable organisation in Canada that provides 
research and information on foreign policy issues. It was founded in 1976. 
106 North-South Institute media release, ‘Human security policy poses difficult choices, says new 
report’, 21 August 2000, <www.nsi-ins.ca/ensi/news_views/news22.html>, accessed 8 March 2001. 
107 See D.Net Newsroom, ‘Lgen W. Leach, “CF perspectives on human security”’. 
108 In 1992 Japan passed the Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations and Other Operations (the International Peace Cooperation Law) which allowed it to 
participate in three main forms of international peace cooperation: UN peacekeeping operations, 
international humanitarian relief operations, and international election monitoring activities.  
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legislation, the Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force was deployed in the 
Indian Ocean to support the US-led war on terrorism in Afghanistan.109 
Like Canada there appears to be no clear rationale provided by the JSDF 
that military capability spending takes account of Japan’s human security 
policy. Japan’s defence budget around the time that it introduced a policy of 
human security was US$37.66 billion and three years later, by 2002, it had 
risen to US$40.4 billion.110 There was no clear reference by the JSDF that 
planning for human security roles was partly the reason. Indeed, the state-
centric nature of security could be increasing in Japan. According to at least 
two strategic analysts, Japan’s combat capability with regard to naval 
acquisitions is expanding so rapidly, along with those of China, Taiwan and 
South Korea, that these ‘programs have overtones of arms racing which 
were not present in acquisitions prior to the economic downturn in 1997–
98’.111  
Apart from global institutions and states, other important agents of 
security are non-state actors (NSAs). Most humanitarian NSAs have critical 
views about the state-centric approach and, in their view, its neglect of 
human security. Nonetheless, NSAs and donor states are increasingly 
forming partnerships and becoming mutually dependent in many human 
security crises, especially when humanitarian intervention requires the use 
of force. NSAs and states that are concerned with human security issues are 
also increasingly coming together over some of the conceptual issues 
regarding the contentious issues of sovereignty and humanitarian 
 
109 Beth Greener-Barcham, PhD candidate, Department of International Relations, The Australian 
National University, provided helpful ideas about Japan’s contemporary security position. 
Discussions 30 October 2002.  
110 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The military balance 2000–2001 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, October 2000), pp. 167–218; and International Institute for Strategic Studies, The 
military balance 2001–2002 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, October 2001), pp. 161–213. Unlike 
Canada, Japan’s aid budget from 1990 to 2000 increased by almost 50 per cent, though in 2001 it 
began to decrease. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Fact sheet: Japan’s development policies’, 
<www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2002/policy-f.html>, accessed 11 November 2002. 
111 W.S.G. Bateman, ‘Strategic and political aspects of the law of the sea in East Asia’, PhD dissertation 
(Canberra: Australian Defence Force Academy, University of New South Wales, 2001), p. 85; and 
Desmond Ball, ‘September 11: Political and security impact and changes in the strategic balance of 
the Asia–Pacific Region – An emerging arms race?’, paper prepared for the 16th Asia–Pacific 
Roundtable, organised by ISIS Malaysia on behalf of ASEAN–ISIS, Kuala Lumpur, 2–6 June 2002, 
pp. 30–1. 
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intervention for human protection, as shown by the Responsibility to protect 
report.112 In many of these endeavours NSAs are implicitly taking a 
position on security that involves seeking human-centric approaches by 
working with states to establish better states, which among other things 
adhere to internationally agreed norms of behaviour.  
Reviewing the security approaches taken in the four scholarly works and 
by several security agents confirms that there are attempts to understand and 
practice security as a dialectic between the state-centric and human-centric 
paradigms. It is more difficult to argue from this analysis however that there 
is a synthesis or via media developing. However, Lodgaard’s ‘dual concept’ 
is suggestive.  
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF SECURITY DIALECTICS 
The argument that security is beginning to involve a dialectic between the 
state-centric and human-centric approaches is still evolving and requires 
further conceptualising and empirical research. Its strength is that it 
grapples with the serious problem that the earlier critiques revealed, that 
the state-centric and human-centric approaches are each necessary but not 
sufficient to address the many dangerous issues on the contemporary 
security agenda. Recognising the value of both approaches and the 
security dialectic between referent objects, threats and means involves 
stepping across disciplinary boundaries. This will be considered a 
weakness by some IR scholars, such as Buzan. 
Showing that there are dialectics between the elements will also be 
considered a weakness from a strong or purely normative perspective. From 
this viewpoint, people suffering the injustices of severe underdevelopment 
 
112 Two of the stated basic core principles of the report are that: ‘State sovereignty implies 
responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself 
… When a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or 
state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-
intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect’. While these principles clearly 
challenge the common understanding of state sovereignty the objective is nonetheless to ‘strengthen, 
not weaken the sovereignty of states, and to improve the capacity of the international community to 
react decisively when states are either unable or unwilling to protect their own people’. International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The responsibility to protect (Ottawa: 
International Development Research Centre, December 2001), p. 75.  
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and abuse of humanitarian principles, is morally wrong regardless of the 
consequences for external or internal order.  
The human-centric approach adopted in the works examined is based on 
a weaker normative and more pragmatic stance than the one above. For 
example, Thomas and Tow describe a causal dialectic between internal 
problems and external order, arguing that it is necessary to prevent and 
address serious problems of underdevelopment inside states because this 
can lead to transnational threats to state-to-state relations, which in turn 
affects the security of people within that state and others. All the other 
works emphasise causal and constitutive connections and dialectics. This is 
not going to be acceptable to the strong normative position above and hence 
a weakness of security dialectics is its inability to accommodate this 
position. 
On the other hand, the weaker normative and more pragmatic position is 
likely to be politically more acceptable to security agents. Having two 
referent objects helps to overcome some of the political-cultural resistance 
to the concept of human security which is seen as a replacement to the state 
referent object which is being imposed by the West on developing countries.  
At the same time, because people are the other referent object, it puts 
conditions on the state-centric approach, for example on the right of 
sovereignty. An illustration of this can be seen in the Responsibility to 
protect report.113 In effect the report takes sovereignty and people to be 
equally important, but reconceptualises sovereignty as a responsibility not 
an unequivocal right. 
An empirical weakness of security dialectics is that even those states that 
put it into practice are at this stage still tipped towards the state-centric 
approach. Many other states hardly consider security dialectics as an 
approach or if they do it is focused on the development rather than the 
humanitarian agenda.  
The final problem is that the security dialectics proposed in the earlier 
ideal-type and in the works examined fail to grapple with the issue of 
 
113 ICISS, The responsibility to protect.  
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balance, or establish what could be and should be a proper via media 
between the state and human-centric approaches.  
Advancing the ideal-type security dialectic 
Clearly more conceptual and empirical research is needed to advance the 
earlier ideal-type security dialectic. On the issue of balance a useful 
starting point for discussion is Robert Jackson’s argument.114 Jackson 
points to the interconnectedness of security: ‘In Kantian terms [it is not 
possible] to separate national security and human security, or international 
security and human security’.115 Indeed, ‘[i]f human insecurity were 
tolerated in some states it would threaten the entire edifice of security 
because of the interconnectedness of the parts that form the whole’.116 On 
the other hand, Jackson argues that making an international response to 
gross violations of human security a ‘requirement’, rather than a ‘discre-
tionary right’117 would be ‘nothing less than a normative revolution in 
world politics: away from national and international security and toward 
human security’.118 It would, he argues, destroy the normative standing of 
sovereignty that makes possible the pluralistic society of states which in 
turn allows for international security. Making ‘sovereignty universally 
conditional on respect for human rights’ is problematic because this 
‘prospect of justifying the use of force to protect civilians in foreign 
countries raises fundamental normative issues which human security 
advocates and activists fail to consider’.119 For Jackson, ‘anyone who 
takes up Kant’s theory in order to promote the doctrine of human security 
would be led astray by it’. Because, he argues, ‘[i]f Kant’s doctrine of 
human security were instituted it would reverse the historic trend to limit 
 
114 Robert Jackson, The global covenant: Human conduct in a world of states (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000). 
115 Jackson, The global covenant, p. 201. 
116 Jackson, The global covenant, p. 200. 
117 Jackson argues that it is this issue which is raised by the proposal from the Commission for Global 
Governance, to the effect that Article 2 of the UN Charter should be respected except for ‘cases that 
constitute a violation of the security of people so gross and extreme that it requires an international 
response on humanitarian grounds’, p. 212. 
118 Jackson, The global covenant, pp. 212–13. 
119 Jackson, The global covenant, pp. 212–13. 
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the right of war. That would be nothing less than a revolutionary 
change’.120 Jackson’s discussion raises some of the conceptual issues that 
need to be considered when trying to find a balance between the norms of 
sovereignty and human security.  
Jackson’s argument provides a point of entry for conceptually advancing 
the ideal-type security dialectic. There are also empirical issues that need 
to be researched: for example, (a) the conditions and context under which 
states pursue security dialectics; (b) how in practice there can be greater 
coordination between the state-centric and human-centric actors, for 
example, between government departments such as defence, foreign 
affairs and trade, international aid, and non-state actors on the one hand 
and on the other, the recipient actors, which may or may not involve state 
actors in the first instance; (c) an examination of how financial resources 
can be more equitably distributed among these actors; and (d) how to 
construct a defence force structure that can support both state-centric and 
human-centric approaches.  
CONCLUSION 
We live in a world where the idea of security is changing. Terrorism is one 
of the major causes for this change in recent times. Counter-terrorism 
approaches should involve a particular formulation of the security 
dialectic between the state and human-centric approaches. In reality the 
‘war on terrorism’ is too skewed towards the state-centric position and 
needs to be more balanced towards the human-centric approach.  
In thinking more generally about changing notions of security in today’s 
world we need to remind ourselves, as mentioned at the beginning of this 
paper, that the state, despite challenges, remains the dominant actor, state-
centric security remains dominant and indeed relevant, and sovereignty is 
both a minus and a plus. It is also a world where there are growing 
normative and utilitarian imperatives to provide better security for people, 
and where there is greater interconnectedness between many of these issues. 
Security dialectics, and perhaps in the future via media approaches, can do 
that better than any single approach, though not without some problems.   
 
120 Jackson, The global covenant, pp. 212–13. 
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